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CASE NOTE
TORT LAW—Re-writing Wyoming’s Co-employee Liability Statute;
Hannifan v. American National Bank of Cheyenne,
185 P.3d 679 (Wyo. 2008).
+ARA , (UNTER

INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2002, Leslie Roy Butts suffered severe injuries while working
at the Black Thunder Mine, a coal mine near Gillette, Wyoming.1 At the time of
the accident, Butts worked laying electrical cable in an area of the mine known as
the East-West Boxcut.2 As Butts worked, a large boulder fell from the high wall
of the mine and landed on top of the Terra Gator operated by Butts.3 As a result,
Butts sustained severe injuries that rendered him a paraplegic.4
The day before Butts’s accident, a safety advisor at the mine, Marty Martens,
noticed dangerous conditions in the boxcut.5 In addition to noticing high wall
instability, Martens noticed that debris ﬁlled the catch benches intended to protect
workers by catching rubble dislodged from the high wall and, thus, rendered
them ineffective as a protective measure.6 Martens relayed his concerns to Michael
Hannifan, a manager at the Mine.7 Hannifan and Kevin Hampleman, also a
manager at the Mine, went to the boxcut and visually inspected the high walls.8

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank Richard Mincer
and Richard Schneebeck, of Hirst Applegate, LLP, and Professor Michael Duff for their insight and
advice.
1
Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, 185 P.3d 679, 681, 685 (Wyo. 2008). American
National Bank appeared in the caption because it served as the conservator of Butts’s estate. )D at
681.
2

)D. at 685.

3

)D. A Terra Gator is a piece of heavy equipment used to lay electrical cable. )D Arch Coal,
Inc. deﬁnes a high wall as “the unexcavated face of exposed overburden and coal in a surface mine or
in a face or bank on the uphill side of a contour mine excavation.” Arch Coal, Inc., -INING 4ERMS,
(2008), http://www.archcoal.com/community/miningterms.asp (last visited March 22, 2009).
4

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 681.

5

)D. at 687.

6

)D. (stating Martens noticed debris ﬁlled the catch benches); Brief in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment at 7, Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, No. 25736 (Dist. Ct., 6th
Judicial Dist., Campbell County, Wyo. 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief ] (discussing the purpose
of catch benches).
7
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 686–87. As the Mine’s safety manager, Hannifan’s responsibilities
included identifying dangers and taking action to protect against identiﬁed dangers. )D at 686.
8

)D. at 687. As the general mine manager, Hampleman’s responsibilities included ensuring
the overall functioning of the mine. )D
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While Hannifan and Hampleman inspected the area, blasting operations took
place.9 Neither Hannifan nor Hampleman observed the dislodging of any rubble
as a result of the blasts.10 They, therefore, decided to allow mining operations to
continue.11
Even before Martens expressed his concerns to Hannifan, others had warned
both Hannifan and Hampleman of dangerous conditions in the boxcut.12 Dan
Dowdy, also a mine employee, speciﬁcally warned Hannifan and Hampleman
that dangerous conditions existed in the boxcut after Dowdy narrowly escaped
death when a section of the high wall collapsed.13 Additionally, in the months
before Butts’s accident, a number of employees submitted written comments
complaining of high wall instability and referring to the boxcut as a “death trap”
and “death valley.”14 Despite these warnings, neither Hannifan nor Hampleman
stopped mining operations in the boxcut prior to Butts’s injury.15
Following the accident, Butts applied for and received Wyoming Worker’s
Compensation beneﬁts.16 The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act provides:
The rights and remedies provided in this act . . . are in lieu of
all other rights and remedies against any employer . . . or their
employees . . . unless the employees intentionally act to cause
physical harm or injury to the injured employee.17

9
Appellants’ Brief at 5–6, Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, 185 P.3d 679 (Wyo.
2008) (No. S070156).
10

)D

11

)D

12

See Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 686–87 (discussing other employees’ conversations with
Hannifan and Hampleman and written comments delivered to Hannifan).
13

)D at 686.

14

Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 8–9. Employees submitted these comments as part of
a safety training course. )D. Hannifan received daily reports summarizing the miners written
comments. )D at 9. Following Butts’s injury, Hannifan ordered his secretary, Emma Barks, to
destroy the comments. )D at 18. Hannifan later produced a copy of one of the reports, but Barks
identiﬁed the report as missing some critical comments. )D at 21. Speciﬁcally, the report no longer
contained the references to miners calling the pit “death valley” and a “death trap.” )D
15
See Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 688 (noting Hannifan and Hampleman decided to continue
operations). Both Hannifan and Hampleman stated in their depositions that they possessed the
authority to remedy unsafe situations. Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 16.
16

Appellants’ Brief, supra note 9, at 2.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104(a) (2007). By providing injured workers beneﬁts in lieu of all
other remedies, the Act effectively provides employers and co-employees immunity from suit, with
the exception that co-employees remain liable for intentional acts. %G, Krier v. Safeway Stores 46,
Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 411 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104 (1997)) (addressing
immunity of employers); Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588, 592 n.1 (Wyo. 1999) (citing WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 27-14-104(a) (1997)) (addressing immunity of co-employees for all but intentional acts).
17
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Pursuant to the statutory exception, Butts ﬁled suit against Hannifan and
Hampleman.18 Citing Hannifan and Hampleman’s failure to halt mining
operations or take other corrective action, Butts alleged Hannifan and Hampleman
intentionally failed to correct the dangerous conditions they knew existed in the
boxcut.19 At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Butts, and the
court entered judgment on the verdict.20 Hannifan and Hampleman appealed.21
On appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Hannifan and Hampleman
contended Butts failed to prove that either appellant “intentionally” acted to
cause physical harm or injury to Butts.22 Hannifan and Hampleman also argued
the court previously erred when it held, in "ERTAGNOLLI V ,OUDERBACK, that the
phrase “intentionally act to cause physical harm” extended co-employee liability
for willful and wanton misconduct.23 The court rejected both arguments and
afﬁrmed the judgment of the trial court.24
This note evaluates the impact of (ANNIFAN V !MERICAN .ATIONAL "ANK OF
Cheyenne. First, the background section brieﬂy discusses the history of co-employee
liability in Wyoming.25 Second, the principal case section summarizes the
reasoning supporting the court’s decision to afﬁrm the judgment in favor of the
defendants.26 Third, the analysis section illustrates the ﬂaws underlying the court’s
conclusion that Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) extends liability for willful

18
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 681. Butts’s wife and his two children also ﬁled suit claiming loss of
consortium. )D Butts’s wife voluntarily dismissed her consortium claim prior to trial. )D
19

Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 23 (“Here the undisputed facts demonstrate that these
Defendants had knowledge of the dangerous conditions which existed in the east/west boxcut and
intentionally in disregard of this risk failed to correct the dangerous conditions.”).
20
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 681–82. The jury found Hannifan 18% at fault, Hampleman 25%
at fault, and the Thunder Basin Coal Company (“Thunder Basin”) 57% at fault. )D While the
court included Thunder Basin on the verdict form, Thunder Basin enjoyed statutory immunity
under Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a), and, therefore, Thunder Basin was not liable for the
portion of fault attributed to it by the jury. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104(a). The jury awarded
damages totaling $18,000,000 to Butts and $2,000,000 to his minor children. Hannifan, 185 P.3d
at 682. The trial court reduced the monetary award to reﬂect only that portion of fault attributed to
Hannifan and Hampleman, and entered judgment for Butts in the amount of $7,740,000, and for
his children in the amount of $860,000. )D
21

Appellants’ Brief, supra note 9, at 3.

22

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 681.

23

Appellants’ Brief, supra note 9, at 3.

24

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 695.

25

See infra notes 29–68 and accompanying text (tracking the history of workers’ compensation
in Wyoming).
26
See infra notes 69–88 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis supporting the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision to afﬁrm the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs).
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and wanton misconduct.27 Fourth, this note explains how the court’s decision to
broaden the exception to co-employee immunity adversely affects both employees
and employers in Wyoming.28

BACKGROUND
In 1913, the Wyoming State Legislature took the ﬁrst step toward the
creation of Wyoming’s workers’ compensation system by amending the Wyoming
Constitution.29 The Legislature believed the enactment of a workers’ compensation
system required a constitutional amendment because the provision of beneﬁts, in
lieu of all other remedies, limited damages in violation of article 10, § 4 of the
Wyoming Constitution.30 The constitutional amendment speciﬁcally allowed for
the establishment of a workers’ compensation fund.31 Following the amendment,
in 1915, the Legislature enacted the “Workmen’s Compensation Law.”32
The Workmen’s Compensation Law, as originally enacted, provided immunity
from suit to employers contributing to the state fund.33 While the statute expressly
provided immunity from suit only to employers, the Wyoming Supreme Court,
nevertheless, extended immunity to co-employees.34 Co-employees enjoyed

27

See infra notes 89–135 and accompanying text (explaining why the language of Wyoming
Statute § 27-14-104(a) does not extend liability for willful and wanton misconduct).
28

See infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text (addressing the impacts of the court’s
decisions on both employees and employers in Wyoming).
29

1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws 75 (amending article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution).

30

Mills v. Reynolds (Mills I), 807 P.2d 383, 389 (Wyo. 1991), overruled by, Mills v. Reynolds
(Mills II), 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992), superseded by statute, 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 68. Prior to
amendment, article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provided: “No law shall be enacted
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person. Any
contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the
death or injury of any employee shall be void.” WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (amended 1913, 1986,
1988, 2004).
31
WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (amended 1986, 1988, 2004). The amendment added the
following sentence: “As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation . . .
to each person injured in such employment.” )D
32

1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 172.

33

)D The statute provided: “The right of each employee to compensation from such funds
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer
contributing, as required by law to such fund.” )D
34

-ILLS ), 807 P.2d at 390. The extension of co-employee immunity resulted from the court’s
decision in "YRNE. )D (citing In re Byrne, 86 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1939)). In "YRNE, the court considered
whether an employee injured by a third party could recover workers’ compensation beneﬁts. 86
P.2d at 1097. The court held the employee could recover beneﬁts regardless of the liability of a third
party. )D at 1102. Apparently, the Wyoming Supreme Court perceived this decision as extending
immunity from suit to co-employees. -ILLS ), 807 P.2d at 390.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss2/10

4

Hunter: Tort Law - Re-writing Wyoming's Co-Employee Liability Statute; Ha

CASE NOTE

2009

649

immunity from suit until 1974 when the Wyoming Supreme Court reinstated
the right to sue a negligent co-employee in -ARKLE V 7ILLIAMSON.35
Shortly after the court decided -ARKLE, the Legislature amended Wyoming’s
workers’ compensation statute to provide co-employees immunity from suit for
all but gross negligence.36 In 1977, the Legislature again amended the statute,
changing the standard for co-employee liability from gross negligence to culpable
negligence.37 In 1986, the Legislature amended the statute to extend complete
immunity to co-employees.38 The court considered the constitutionality of
complete immunity in -ILLS V 2EYNOLDS (-ILLS )).39

The Mills $ECISIONS
In -ILLS ), the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether Wyoming Statute
§ 27-14-104(a) violated the Wyoming Constitution.40 Timothy Mills ﬁled suit
against two co-employees for injuries resulting when a pressure regulator burst in
his face.41 In a separate action, Levi Bunker ﬁled suit against a co-employee for
injuries resulting when Bunker attempted to move electrical equipment connected
to electricity.42 Both Mills and Bunker acted pursuant to instructions from their
co-employee supervisors, the defendants.43 In both actions, the defendants moved
for summary judgment, arguing Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) extended
complete immunity to co-employees.44 The district court consolidated the two
cases for purposes of a summary judgment hearing.45 Following a hearing, the

35
See Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 621–25 (Wyo. 1974) (afﬁrming the entry of
judgment against defendant, a co-employee of the decedent, for the wrongful death of the decedent
on the ground that neither Wyoming Statute § 27-50 (1957) nor the Wyoming Constitution
provided co-employees immunity from suit).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-312(a) (1975) (“The rights and remedies provided in this act . . .
are in lieu of all other rights against any employer . . . or his employees . . . unless the employees are
grossly negligent.”) (emphasis added).
36

37

)D

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104(a) (1986). The Legislature repealed Wyoming Statute
§ 27-312(a) and enacted Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a). )D Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a)
(1986) stated: “The rights and remedies provided in this act . . . are in lieu of all other rights and
remedies against any employer . . . or their employees.”
38

39

-ILLS ), 807 P.2d at 385.

40

)D at 385–86.

41

)D at 387–88.

42

)D at 388.

43

)D at 388. While Marks, one of the co-employees sued by Mills, never instructed Mills to
use the equipment, Marks provided the painting equipment used by Mills. )D at 387.
44

-ILLS ), 807 P.2d at 388.

45

)D
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district court granted summary judgment for all defendants.46 Mills and Bunker
appealed, arguing the statute violated various provisions of the Wyoming
Constitution.47 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the appellants’
arguments and held the statute constitutional.48
Following the court’s decision, the court granted appellants’ petition for
rehearing.49 Upon rehearing, the court reversed its prior decision and held
the statute unconstitutional.50 While a majority of the court held the statute
unconstitutional, a majority of the court failed to reach a conclusion as to why
the statute violated the Wyoming Constitution.51 The case, therefore, establishes
as precedent only the conclusion that complete co-employee immunity violates
the Wyoming Constitution.52
Following -ILLS )), the legislature again amended Wyoming Statute § 27-14104(a).53 Pursuant to the amendment, the Legislature provided co-employees
immunity “unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury
to the injured employee.”54 The Wyoming Supreme Court considered the statute,
in depth, in "ERTAGNOLLI V ,OUDERBACK.55

46

)D

47

)D at 392. Mills and Bunker argued the statute limited damages in violation of the art.
10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and deprived appellants of the right to access the courts in
violation of equal protection guarantees. )D
48

)D at 386.

49

-ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 49, superseded by statute, 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 68.

50

)D The court reversed by a three to two (3-2) decision. )D at 49–55.

51

See id. at 49–71. Chief Justice Macy held the statute unconstitutional as violative of Equal
Protection, reasoning the right to access the courts constituted a fundamental right. )D at 55.
Justice Cardine held the statute unconstitutional because it violated article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming
Constitution. )D at 56. He characterized the right to access the courts as an ordinary right. )D at
56. Justice Urbigkit held the statute violated equal protection, concluding the right to access the
courts was a fundamental right. )D at 60. Justice Thomas held the statute constitutional and held
the right to access the courts constituted an ordinary right. )D at 67. Justice Golden also held the
statute constitutional and also characterized the right to access the courts as fundamental. )D at 71.
52
See McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting North v. Superior
Court of Riverside County, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Cal. 1972)) (stating the judgment of an equally
divided court is without force as precedent); see also Altria Group v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 554
(2008) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)) (“Because the
‘plurality opinion . . . did not represent the views of a majority of the Court, we are not bound by its
reasoning.’”); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910) (“[T]he principles of law involved
not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an
authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.”).
53

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104(a) (1993).

54

)D (emphasis added).

55

67 P.3d 627, 631–32 (Wyo. 2003).
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Bertagnolli v. Louderback
In "ERTAGNOLLI, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the
district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of two co-employee
defendants.56 Joe Bertagnolli ﬁled suit against two co-employee supervisors,
Larry Westbrook and Max Louderback, after Bertagnolli suffered a severe injury
that resulted in the eventual amputation of his right leg, to a point just below
the knee.57 Bertagnolli ﬁled suit pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a),
alleging Westbrook and Louderback intentionally ordered him to work next to
equipment they knew posed signiﬁcant dangers to workers.58 Westbrook and
Louderback moved for summary judgment on the basis that Bertagnolli failed to
prove the defendants knew of the dangerous conditions.59 The trial court granted
the defendants motions.60
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court began by clarifying the standard
for co-employee liability.61 The court reviewed Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a)
and concluded the statute extended liability for both intentional acts and willful
and wanton misconduct.62 The court reasoned the statutory language and the
willful and wanton misconduct standard were legally equivalent because both the
statute and the willful and wanton misconduct required intentional acts.63 The
court also concluded the Legislature intended to extend liability for willful and
wanton misconduct because the Legislature amended the statute in light of the
court’s decision in -ILLS )), declaring immunity for intentional acts and willful
and wanton misconduct unconstitutional.64

56

)D at 629.

57

)D at 630. Bertagnolli tripped while shoveling coal and caught his right heel in the
components of a shuttle belt. )D The shuttle belt moved ore through the mine. )D at 629. When
Bertagnolli’s heel caught, the components severed his right heel. )D at 630. Following eleven
unsuccessful surgeries, doctors amputated Bertagnolli’s foot. )D
58

)D

59

)D

60

"ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 630. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, both parties
stipulated the standard codiﬁed in Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) and the willful and wanton
misconduct standard constituted the appropriate co-employee liability standard. )D A stipulation
of the parties as to the law is not binding on the court, however. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs, 790 P.2d 663, 674 (Wyo. 1990).
61

"ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 631.

62

)D at 632.

63

)D

64

)D at 632–33 (citing -ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 55). The court characterized -ILLS )) as holding
co-employee immunity for intentional acts and willful and wanton misconduct unconstitutional.
)D (citing -ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 55). The court then relied on the premise that the Legislature knows
the state of the law and enacts statutes in accordance with the law. )D at 633 (citing Fosler v. Collins,
13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000)).
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Following the court’s clariﬁcation of the standard for co-employee liability,
the court addressed the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.65 The court
concluded the district court erred by granting the motions because questions of
fact remained.66 The court, therefore, remanded.67 While the actual disposition of
"ERTAGNOLLI is not relevant for purposes of this note, the legal conclusions reached
in "ERTAGNOLLI remain relevant because the court relied on the same conclusions in
reaching its decision in Hannifan.68

PRINCIPAL CASE
In (ANNIFAN V !MERICAN .ATIONAL "ANK OF #HEYENNE, the Wyoming Supreme
Court considered the appropriateness of a jury verdict in favor of an injured mine
employee against two co-employee defendants.69 The court held Wyoming Statute
§ 27-14-104(a) extended co-employee liability for both intentional acts and
willful and wanton misconduct.70 The court then concluded sufﬁcient evidence
existed to support the jury ﬁnding that Hannifan and Hampleman “acted with
willful and wanton, intentional negligence.”71

-AJORITY /PINION *USTICE (ILL *OINED BY *USTICES 'OLDEN +ITE AND "URKE
The majority began its analysis by addressing the standard for co-employee
liability.72 The court stated, in no uncertain terms, that "ERTAGNOLLI serves as a
complete restatement of the law.73 Following this statement, the court quoted
a substantial portion of the "ERTAGNOLLI decision, including the conclusion “the
concept of willful and wanton misconduct has essentially the same legal effect as
the statutory language.”74 The court supported this conclusion by advancing two
lines of reasoning.75 First, the court reasoned both the statutory standard and the
willful and wanton misconduct standard require intentional acts.76 Second, the
court reasoned the Legislature intended to extend co-employee liability for willful

65

See id. at 634–35 (reviewing the facts and the propriety of the district court’s judgment).

66

"ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 635.

67

)D

68

See Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 682–84 (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI extensively).

69

)D at 681.

70

)D at 683.

71

)D at 695.

72

)D at 683.

73

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 683.

74

)D (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632).

75

)D

76

)D (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632).
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and wanton misconduct because the Legislature amended the statute after the
court’s decision in -ILLS )), holding co-employee immunity for intentional acts
and willful and wanton misconduct unconstitutional.77
After concluding willful and wanton misconduct constituted the appropriate
standard for co-employee liability, the court addressed the remaining issues raised
by Hannifan and Hampleman on appeal.78 First, the court considered whether
sufﬁcient evidence existed to support the jury verdict in favor of Butts.79 The
court reviewed the evidence and concluded sufﬁcient evidence existed to support
the ﬁnding that (1) Hannifan and Hampleman knew of the dangerous conditions
in the boxcut, (2) had supervisory authority for Butts’s safety, and (3) disregarded
the risks of danger.80
Second, the court addressed the adequacy of the jury instructions given by
the trial court.81 The court compared the proposed and given instructions and
concluded the trial court adequately apprised the jury of the law.82 Third, the court
considered whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hannifan and
Hampleman’s motions for either a mistrial or new trial.83 The court found the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying either motion and, therefore
afﬁrmed the lower court’s judgment.84
77

)D (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632–33).

78

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 684–85.

79

)D at 684.

80

)D at 689.

81

)D

82

)D at 692. The court, however, proposed the following instruction for future use:
A co-employee is liable to another co-employee if the employee acts intentionally
to cause physical harm or injury. To act intentionally to cause physical injury is
to act with willful and wanton misconduct. Willful and wanton misconduct is
the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless
disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that
a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct
would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. In the context
of co-employee liability, willful and wanton misconduct requires the co-employee
to have 1) actual knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved;
2) direct responsibility for the injured employee’s safety and work conditions; and
3) willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness of the high probability
that serious injury or death may result.

)D at 692 n.2.
83
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 693. At the conclusion of the trial, Hannifan and Hampleman
requested the trial court grant a mistrial or new trial based upon statements made by Butts’s counsel
during closing arguments. )D at 694–95. Butts’s counsel informed the jury that any fault attributed
to Thunder Basin, a non-party to the suit on account of immunity extended under the Wyoming
Worker’s Compensation Act, would diminish the Butts’s recovery. )D.
84

)D at 695. The majority concluded, “[t]he evidence was sufﬁcient to sustain the jury’s
conclusion that the Appellants acted with willful and wanton, intentional negligence.” )D (emphasis
added).
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#ONCURRING /PINION #HIEF *USTICE 6OIGT
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Voigt expressed concern that the court
created an exception to co-employee immunity not intended by the Legislature.85
First, Chief Justice Voigt reasoned the court’s decision blurred the distinction
between intentional harms and willful and wanton misconduct.86 Second, Chief
Justice Voigt interpreted Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) as requiring both
an intent to act and an intent to cause harm and highlighted that the court’s
deﬁnition of willful and wanton misconduct contemplated only an intent to act.87
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Voigt cited adherence to stare decisis and joined the
result reached by the majority.88

ANALYSIS
This section begins by discussing the doctrine of stare decisis, cited by Chief
Justice Voigt as his primary reason for concurring in the court’s decision.89 Next,
the analysis illuminates the ﬂaws underlying the court’s decisions in "ERGTAGNOLLI
and Hannifan.90 The analysis concludes by considering the adverse impact of the
court’s decision on Wyoming employees and employers.91

4HE $OCTRINE OF 3TARE $ECISIS
The doctrine of stare decisis charges courts to adhere to past decisions.92
Despite the commanding nature of the doctrine, stare decisis constitutes a policy
doctrine, not an unyielding rule requiring blind adherence to past decisions.93
As the court previously recognized, courts should not adhere to past decisions
when those decisions rely upon incorrect principles of law, poor reasoning, or
unworkable standards.94 In #OOK V 3TATE, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated,
85

)D at 695 (Voigt, C.J., concurring).

86

)D (Voigt, C.J., concurring).

87

)D (Voigt, C.J., concurring).

88

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 695 (Voigt, C.J., concurring).

89

See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (clarifying the doctrine of stare decisis).

90

See infra notes 97–135 and accompanying text (explaining the errors made by the court in
both "ERTAGNOLLI and Hannifan).
91
See infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse impact of the court’s
decision on employees and employers in Wyoming).
92
%G, Borns v. Voss, 70 P.3d 262, 271 (Wyo. 2003) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414
(7th ed. 1999)); State ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp. Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1161(Wyo. 1999)
(quoting Goodrich v. Strobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1443 (8th ed. 2004) (deﬁning stare decisis as “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary
for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”).
93

%G "ARKER, 978 P.2d at 1161 (quoting 'OODRICH, 908 P.2d at 420); 'OODRICH, 908 P.2d 420
(quoting Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692–93 (Wyo. 1995).
94

%G "ORNS, 70 P.3d at 271 (citations omitted); Dunnegan v. Laramie County Commr’s,
852 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1993); Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992).
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“[w]isdom does not come to us often. . . . When it does, we should embrace [it,]
not slavishly reject it because of a questionable application of legal doctrine.”95
Nevertheless, in Hannifan, the court chose to follow the ﬂawed co-employee
liability standard adopted in "ERTAGNOLLI.96

The Flawed Standard of Liability
In "ERTAGNOLLI, the court initially held that Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a)
extended co-employee liability for both intentional acts and willful and wanton
misconduct.97 The court supported this conclusion by reasoning: (1) the statutory
standard and the willful and wanton standard amounted to legal equivalents, and
(2) the Legislature intended the 1993 amendment to extend liability for willful and
wanton misconduct.98 As the following analysis illustrates, the court’s conclusion
that the statutory standard amounts to willful and wanton misconduct ignores
the structure of the statutory language and equates two contrary legal concepts.99
As indicated by the statutory language “unless the employees intentionally act
to cause physical harm or injury,” Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) contemplates
both the intent to act and the intent to cause harm.100 Intent requires the actor
desire the consequence of his act or believe the consequence is substantially certain
to follow.101 Willful and wanton misconduct requires that the actor disregard the

95

#OOK, 841 P.2d at 1353.

96

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 683 (“The "ERTAGNOLLI case now serves as a complete restatement
of Wyoming’s jurisprudence in this regard.”); see infra notes 97–135 and accompanying text
(explaining the ﬂaws underlying the "ERTAGNOLLI court’s adoption of a willful and wanton misconduct
standard for co-employee liability).
97

"ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 633.

98

)D at 632–33 (“We continue to believe the concept of willful and wanton misconduct has
essentially the same legal effect as the statutory language ‘intentionally act to cause physical harm or
injury.’”).
99
See infra notes 100–15 and accompanying text (explaining that the statute requires both
an intent to act and an intent to cause harm and illustrating the differences between the concepts of
intent and willful and wanton misconduct).
100
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 695 (Voigt, C.J., concurring) (“It appears to me that the word
‘intentionally’ applies both to the word ‘act’ and to the word ‘cause.’ If that was not the legislature’s
intent, the phrase would read ‘unless the employees intentionally act and cause physical harm or
injury to the injured employee.’”).
101

%G, Burrow v. Delta Container, 887 So. 2d 599, 602 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Bazley
v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981)); Vasquez v. Six Flags Houston, Inc., 120 S.W.3d
445, 448 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Rodriguez v. Naylor Industries, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.
1989)); Security Title Guar. Corp. of Baltimore v. McDill Columbus Corp., 543 So. 2d 852, 855
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Deane v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 3, 8 (Fla. 1958)); cf. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 825 (8th ed. 2004) (deﬁning intent as “[t]he state of mind accompanying an act, esp.
a forbidden act. While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or
determination to do it. When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists, motive becomes
immaterial.”).
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consequence of an act when a reasonable person would know the act would, in a
high probability, result in harm to another.102
The two standards differ in substantial ways.103 First, the standards differ in
the intent required.104 In $ANCULOVICH V "ROWN, the court expressly stated “the
intent in willful and wanton misconduct is not intent to cause the injury.”105
In Hannifan, the court also acknowledged the difference by noting that willful
and wanton misconduct requires only “a state of mind approaching intent to do
harm.”106 Second, the standards differ with respect to the showing of knowledge
required.107 Willful and wanton misconduct, as deﬁned by the court in Hannifan,
requires knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm.108 Intent, however,
requires either the actor desire to cause the harm or act with substantial certainty
harm will follow.109 While knowledge of a probability of harm sufﬁces to prove
willful and wanton misconduct, it fails to prove intent.110 Third, the standards
differ in whether an objective or subjective state of mind is required.111 The
102
%G, Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 692 n.2 (proposing future instruction on the appropriate
standard for co-employee liability); "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632 (citing Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d
1361, 1370 (Wyo. 1986)); Mayﬂower Rest. Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987)); see
also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 213 (W. Page Keeton ed., West Publishing Co. 1984) (1941)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 (1965)).
103

See infra notes 104–15 and accompanying text (illustrating the ways the standards differ).

104

See Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979) (stating the intent in willful
and wanton misconduct differs from the intent to cause harm).
105

)D.

106

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 692.

107

Compare id. at 692 n.2 (deﬁning willful and wanton misconduct as requiring knowledge
of a high degree of probability of harm), WITH "URROW, 887 So. 2d at 602 (citing "AZLEY, 396 So. 2d
at 481) (stating intent requires the actor desire to cause the consequence of the act or believe the
consequence is substantially certain to follow).
108

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 692 n.2. The court deﬁned willful and wanton misconduct as

follows:
Willful and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an
intentional failure to do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and
under circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have
reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result
in harm to another.
)D
109

%G, "URROW, 887 So. 2d at 602 (citing "AZLEY, 397 So. 2d at 481); 6ASQUEZ, 120 S.W.3d at
448 (citing 2ODRIGUEZ, 763 S.W.2d at 412); 3ECURITY 4ITLE 'UAR #ORP OF "ALTIMORE, 543 So. 2d at 855
(citing $EANE, 104 So. 2d at 8).
110
See PROSSER, supra note 102, at 36; see also Oros v. Hull & Assocs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d
839, 844 (D. N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 1991));
Jackson v. Latini Mach. Co., 960 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (D. E.D. La. 1997) (citing Williams v.
Gervais F. Favrot Co., Inc., 573 So. 2d 533 (La. Ct. App. 1991)).
111
Compare Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 692 n.2 (stating willful and wanton misconduct requires a
reasonable person would know harm would result), WITH "URROW, 887 So. 2d at 602 (citing "AZLEY,
397 So. 2d at 481) (deﬁning intent as requiring the actor desire the consequences of his act).
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court’s formulation of the willful and wanton misconduct standard requires a
reasonable person would know a high probability of danger existed, an objective
standard.112 Intent requires the “actor desire” the consequence of his act, a
subjective standard.113 With respect to the subjective standard, the focus is on the
actor rather than a hypothetical reasonable person.114 As this discussion suggests,
the Wyoming Supreme Court erred by equating two contrary legal principles.115
The court also erred by reasoning the Legislature intended to extend liability for
willful and wanton misconduct.116
In "ERTAGNOLLI, the court concluded the Legislature intended co-employees
to remain liable for willful and wanton misconduct.117 The court reasoned the
Legislature amended the statute knowing of the court’s decision in -ILLS )), which
the court construed as holding co-employee immunity for intentional acts and
willful and wanton misconduct unconstitutional.118 In -ILLS )), the court deﬁned
the issue as whether Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a), granting co-employees
complete immunity from suit, violated the Wyoming Constitution.119 In the
opening paragraph of the decision, the court speciﬁcally held that the extension
of complete immunity to co-employees violated the Wyoming Constitution.120
Following the court’s initial statement of the holding, Justice Macy, the author of
the plurality opinion, addressed the reasoning supporting the plurality’s holding.121
In this discussion, Justice Macy only discussed complete immunity.122 In fact, he
failed to even mention “willful and wanton misconduct” until the second to last
paragraph of the plurality’s nearly eight page decision.123
112
Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 692 n.2 (“Willful and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing
of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act . . . under circumstances and conditions that a
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO KNOW, that such conduct would . . . result in harm to
another.” (emphasis added)).
113
%G, "URROW, 887 So. 2d at 602 (citing "AZLEY, 397 So. 2d at 481); 6ASQUEZ, 120 S.W.3d at
448 (citing 2ODRIGUEZ, 763 S.W.2d at 412); 3ECURITY 4ITLE 'UAR #ORP OF "ALTIMORE, 543 So. 2d at 855
(citing $EANE, 104 So. 2d at 8).

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (8th ed. 2004) (deﬁning subjective as “[b]ased on an
individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions, as opposed to externally veriﬁable phenomena”).
114

115
See supra notes 97–114 and accompanying text (explaining why the concepts of intent and
willful and wanton misconduct differ).
116
See infra notes 117–34 and accompanying text (explaining why the court erred by
concluding the Legislature intended to extend liability for willful and wanton misconduct).
117

"ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632–34.

118

)D

119

-ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 49.

120

)D

121

See id. at 49–55 (providing the court’s analysis).

122

See id. (considering the constitutional challenge to complete immunity).

123

See id. at 49–56 (stating for the ﬁrst time “[i]n summary, the legislature’s grant of complete
immunity to co-employees, which includes immunity for intentional acts and for willful and
wanton misconduct, infringed upon the fundamental right to access to the courts”).
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While the plurality opinion ﬂeetingly mentioned willful and wanton
misconduct, the opinion focused almost entirely on complete immunity.124 Taken
as a whole, the opinion makes it very difﬁcult for the Legislature to discern whether
the court would hold the extension of co-employee immunity for willful and
wanton misconduct unconstitutional.125 Therefore, the "ERTAGNOLLI court erred by
assuming the court enunciated its holding in -ILLS )) with the clarity necessary to
provide the Legislature with notice as to the state of the law.126 In addition to this
error, the court also erred by failing to consider the legislative history behind the
amendment to the statute.127
In 1993, when the Legislature sought to amend Wyoming Statute § 27-14104(a), the State Senate considered and rejected a State House amendment seeking
to impose co-employee liability for culpable negligence.128 Following the Senate’s
rejection of a culpable negligence standard, the Senate adopted an amendment
imposing liability only when employees “intentionally act to cause physical harm
or injury.”129 The Senate’s rejection of a willful and wanton misconduct standard
becomes evident by comparing the court’s deﬁnitions of “culpable negligence”
and “willful and wanton misconduct.”130
A comparison of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s deﬁnitions of “culpable
negligence” and “willful and wanton misconduct” reveals that the deﬁnitions
essentially mirror one another.131 In fact, in -C+ENNAN V .EWMAN, the court
deﬁned “culpable negligence” as willful and serious misconduct.132 The court then

124
-ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 49–55 (illustrating the court’s devotion of its efforts to a discussion of
the constitutionality of complete immunity).
125
See id. (discussing the constitutionality of complete immunity and mentioning willful and
wanton misconduct only in the second to last paragraph of the opinion).
126

3EE "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632–33 (stating the court presumes the Legislature knows of the
court’s decisions and enacts legislation accordingly).
127

See id. at 632–33 (stating the court’s conclusion is “consistent with the parameters of
statutory construction” but failing to consider any legislative history).
128

1993 LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, H.B. 0034, 82–85.

129

See id. (containing the votes rejecting the culpable negligence standards and approving the
intentional language).
130

See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (comparing the deﬁnitions of culpable
negligence and willful and wanton misconduct).
131

#OMPARE +RIER, 943 P.2d at 417 (citing Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 716 (Wyo.
1995)) (deﬁning culpable negligence as “the intentional commission of an act of unreasonable
character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
harm will follow”), with Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 683 (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632) (deﬁning
willful and wanton misconduct as “the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do
an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances . . . a reasonable person
would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result
in harm to another”).
132

902 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).
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used the deﬁnition of culpable negligence to deﬁne willful misconduct.133 If the
terms “culpable negligence” and “willful and wanton misconduct” actually equate
to the same standard, the Legislature’s rejection of a culpable negligence standard
also rejects the willful and wanton misconduct standard.134 The court’s decision
to impose co-employee liability, regardless of the Legislature’s intent, signiﬁcantly
impacts employees in Wyoming.135

)MPACT OF THE #OURTS $ECISION IN Hannifan
The court’s decision in Hannifan signiﬁcantly and adversely impacts
employees in the State by imposing the incidental costs of industry on those
employees personally.136 As a result of the court’s decision, a manager who makes
one questionable decision in the course and scope of employment, such as the
decision to allow mining to continue, now faces personal liability.137 A manager’s
life savings, the investments he plans to use to pay for his children’s college, and
potentially even the retirement funds he will depend on in his later years of life are
now at risk.138 Such a result is inherently unfair.
The court’s decision also adversely impacts employers in Wyoming by
imposing additional costs.139 Some employers, facing pressure from risk
adverse management employees, will ultimately obtain additional insurance to
cover those employees.140 Employers end up paying twice, once in the form of

133

)D (citations omitted) (“[C]ourts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct has
occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act of unreasonable
character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that
harm will follow.”).
134
Compare +RIER, 943 P.2d at 417 (citing Smith, 893 P.2d at 716) (deﬁning culpable
negligence), with Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 682 (quoting "ERTAGNOLLI, 67 P.3d at 632) (deﬁning willful
and wanton misconduct).
135

See infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text (addressing the impact of the decision on
employees and the employers in Wyoming).
136
3EE -ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 66 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing his concern that employees
will face personal liability for their co-employees work-related injuries).
137
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (considering the consequences of the court’s decision in
-ILLS ))).
138
)D (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating “[t]he homeowner’s insurance of every worker
who owns a home; that worker’s personal and real property; that worker’s savings accounts and
investments; and, perhaps, even that worker’s retirement fund may all become available to respond
to the claim for damages”).
139

See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the effects of the court’s decision in -ILLS )),
including increased costs to the employer resulting because “[h]e pays by his contribution to the
workers compensation fund, and he pays by virtue of what will have to be additional premium for
his liability insurance”).
140
See id. (Thomas, J. dissenting) (discussing the effect of the decision on employers and
stressing the increased cost to employers deriving from the maintenance of liability insurance).
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contributions to the State’s workers’ compensation fund and a second time in the
form of insurance premiums paid to insure managers from personal liability.141
The Legislature could not have intended such a result.142

CONCLUSION
In (ANNIFAN V !MERICAN .ATIONAL "ANK OF #HEYENNE, the Wyoming Supreme
Court afﬁrmed a jury verdict in favor of an injured mine employee against
two co-employees.143 The court reached this conclusion by adopting its earlier
holding, reached in "ERTAGNOLLI, that Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) extends
co-employee liability for intentional acts and willful and wanton misconduct.144
While Chief Justice Voigt expressed concern the court’s decision created an
exception to co-employee immunity not intended by the Legislature, he cited
stare decisis and joined the majority result.145 As discussed, however, courts should
not adhere to precedent based upon incorrect conclusions of law.146
"ERTAGNOLLI advanced several incorrect conclusions, including the conclusion
that the statutory standard and the “willful and wanton misconduct” standard
constitute legal equivalents.147 "ERTAGNOLLI also advanced the incorrect conclusion
that the Legislature intended to extend liability for willful and wanton
misconduct.148 Despite the errors in "ERTAGNOLLI, the Hannifan court adopted and
extended "ERTAGNOLLIS holdings.149 As a result, employees in Wyoming now face
personal liability for decisions made in the course and scope of employment and
employers face increased costs deriving from paying both workers’ compensation
dues and liability insurance premiums.150

141

-ILLS )), 837 P.2d at 66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

142

)D (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“When this situation is recognized for what it is, it does seem
that the product of the new decisions is antithetical to the intent of the workers’ compensation
statutes.”).
143

Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 695.

144

)D at 683.

145

)D at 695 (Voigt, C.J., concurring).

146

See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and
the principle that courts should not adhere to decisions based on incorrect legal conclusions).
147
See supra notes 97–115 and accompanying text (explaining why the statutory standard and
the willful and wanton misconduct standard differ).
148
See supra notes 117–34 and accompanying text (explaining why the court’s conclusion that
the Legislature intended to extend liability for willful and wanton misconduct is incorrect).
149

See Hannifan, 185 P.3d at 683 (stating that "ERTAGNOLLI serves as a complete restatement of
the law and quoting "ERTAGNOLLI extensively).
150

See supra notes 136–42 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the adverse impact of
the court’s decision on Wyoming’s employees and employers).
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